On vulnerability and protection of ad hoc on-demand distance vector protocol

被引:9
作者
Wang, WC [1 ]
Lu, Y [1 ]
Bhargava, BK [1 ]
机构
[1] Purdue Univ, CERIAS, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
来源
ICT'2003: 10TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, VOLS I AND II, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS | 2003年
关键词
ad hoc networks; AODV; vulnerability; intrusion detection;
D O I
10.1109/ICTEL.2003.1191259
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
Vulnerabilities and the attacks on Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol are investigated and studied via analysis and simulation. The attacks are classified by their target properties. The analysis shows that the on-demand route query enables the malicious host to conduct real time attacks on AODV. False distance vector and false destination sequence attacks are studied by simulation. Two connection scenarios: common destination and uniformly distributed traffic load are considered. The delivery ratio, attack overhead, and the propagation of false routes are measured by varying the number of connections and the mobility of the hosts. The simulation results illustrate that the attacker can confuse the network connectivity with false routes and lead to a decrease up to 75% in the delivery ratio. When the hosts are uniformly distributed, the false distance vector attacks can not cheat more than half of the hosts. But the false destination sequence routes can propagate to most of the network. The anomaly patterns of sequence numbers carried by routing request (RREQ) can be applied to detect the false destination sequence attacks. The vulnerability analysis results and anomaly patterns can be employed by other Ad Hoc routing protocols to establish intrusion prevention and detection mechanisms.
引用
收藏
页码:375 / 382
页数:8
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