Agency theory;
Incentives;
Pay for performance;
Risk;
Risk aversion;
MORAL HAZARD;
INCENTIVES;
FIRMS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.005
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
Making use of a unique representative data set, we find clear evidence that risk aversion has a highly significant and substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent, which confirms the well known risk-incentive trade-off. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Department of Economics, Loyola University Maryland, 4501 N. Charles St., Baltimore, 21210, MDDepartment of Economics, Loyola University Maryland, 4501 N. Charles St., Baltimore, 21210, MD
Walters S.J.K.
von Allmen P.
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h-index: 0
机构:
Department of Economics, Skidmore College, 815 N. Broadway, Saratoga Springs, 12866, NYDepartment of Economics, Loyola University Maryland, 4501 N. Charles St., Baltimore, 21210, MD
von Allmen P.
Krautmann A.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Department of Economics, DePaul University, 1 E. Jackson Blvd., Chicago, 60604, ILDepartment of Economics, Loyola University Maryland, 4501 N. Charles St., Baltimore, 21210, MD