Evidence on performance pay and risk aversion

被引：46

作者：

Grund, Christian ^{[2
]}

Sliwka, Dirk ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Cologne, D-50931 Cologne, Germany

[2] Univ Wurzburg, D-97070 Wurzburg, Germany

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2010年 / 106卷 / 01期

关键词：

Agency theory; Incentives; Pay for performance; Risk; Risk aversion; MORAL HAZARD; INCENTIVES; FIRMS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Making use of a unique representative data set, we find clear evidence that risk aversion has a highly significant and substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent, which confirms the well known risk-incentive trade-off. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：8 / 11

页数：4

共 16 条

[1] Endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form [J].