Default and renegotiation: A dynamic model of debt

被引：366
作者：
Hart, O [1 ]
Moore, J
机构：
[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England
[3] Univ St Andrews, St Andrews KY16 9AJ, Fife, Scotland
来源：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1998年 / 113卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1162/003355398555496
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows, rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract-specifically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment-under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal. In the second part we consider a more general class of(nondebt) contracts, and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these.
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页码：1 / 41
页数：41
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