Renegotiations of Water Concessions: Empirical Analysis of Main Determinants

被引:5
作者
Andrade, Isabel [1 ]
Cruz, Carlos Oliveira [2 ]
Sarmento, Joaquim Miranda [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Lisbon, Lisbon Sch Econ & Management, Entidade Reguladora Serv Aguas & Residuos, Water & Waste Serv Regulat Author, P-1200781 Lisbon, Portugal
[2] Univ Lisbon, Inst Super Tecn, Civil Engn Res & Innovat Sustainabil, P-1049001 Lisbon, Portugal
[3] Univ Lisbon, Lisbon Sch Econ & Management, CGS Adv ISEG, P-1200781 Lisbon, Portugal
关键词
Water concessions; Renegotiations; Concessions; Portugal; PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; LATIN-AMERICA; RENT-SEEKING; MANAGEMENT; MODEL; INFRASTRUCTURE; PRICES;
D O I
10.1061/(ASCE)WR.1943-5452.0000999
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
The private sector has been increasingly involved in the construction, management, and operation of water systems. There are several models for private-sector participation, but concessions have been made among the preferred choice of local, state, and federal governments. The literature identifies the uncertainty surrounding long-term, capital-intensive infrastructure projects as the main motives leading to renegotiations. The results of renegotiations are biased toward increasing tariffs, and compensation paid by the public sector only more rarely negatively affects the private partner. Renegotiations are perceived as being the main pitfall of concessions. This paper will analyze a unique data set of renegotiations of 31 water concessions in Portugal covering a period from 1995 to 2015. Results show that lower consumption and additional investments are among the main motives for renegotiation, which can occur at any point during the lifetime of a concession. The analysis confirms some initial hypotheses, such as larger concessions and longer contracts being more likely to be renegotiated. Indirectly, the occurrence of elections tends to increase renegotiations.
引用
收藏
页数:12
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