The Demystification of Contracts in Bankruptcy

被引:0
作者
Westbrook, Jay Lawrence [1 ]
White, Kelsi Stayart [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Sch Law, Business Law, Austin, TX 78705 USA
[2] Univ Texas Sch Law, Austin, TX USA
来源
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL | 2017年 / 91卷 / 03期
关键词
LAW;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
A company's ability to retain favorable contracts while escaping unprofitable ones is central to a successful reorganization in Chapter 11 cases. Yet a strange and elusive doctrine often leads the courts to impose unpredictable and perverse results in contract cases. The doctrine requires that a contract have a quality of executoriness," or it must leave the precincts of the Bankruptcy Code for an anarchic limbo where the courts fashion surprising and often unexplained relief. The American Bankruptcy Institute Review Commission ignored the unanimous recommendation of its committee of contract experts, preferring to retain this outdated doctrine with an explanation as unclear as many of the cases attempting to apply it. Based on a reading of all contemporary executoriness cases, this article examines executoriness in each of the major categories of contracts where it imposes confusion and loss in reorganization practice and demonstrates the correct solutions to each. It does so by tying them to the fundamental economic and social policies underlying bankruptcy law.
引用
收藏
页码:481 / 561
页数:81
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