Inequality Aversion, Risk and Incentive in Teamwork

被引:0
作者
Jing, Tu [1 ]
机构
[1] Wuhan Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430081, Peoples R China
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INNOVATION AND MANAGEMENT | 2015年
关键词
Inequality aversion; Risk; Incentive; Teamwork; PREFERENCES; COMPETITION;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
A standard HM model is built on the basic assumptions that agents have no inequality aversion. We introduce inequality into this principal-agent model to study the interaction of inequality aversion, risk and incentive, then compare with the conclusions of the standard HM model. The results of the study are followed. Inequality aversion and the risk of agent's individual task is positively related. High-risk tasks should be assigned to the team and low-risk tasks should be assigned to individuals to reduce the agency costs of incentive. Compared with the conclusions of the HM model, inequality aversion increases agency costs, reduces the incentive for individual performance and has no impact on the incentive for team performance.
引用
收藏
页码:954 / 957
页数:4
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