Relativism and the abolition of the other

被引：1
|
作者：
Blackburn, S [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1TN, England
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2004年 / 12卷 / 03期
关键词：
Wittgenstein; relativism; Davidson; experience; conceptual schemes;
D O I：
10.1080/0967255042000243939
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
In this paper I consider the 'disappearing we' account of Wittgenstein's attitude to other ways of thought or other 'conceptual schemes'. I argue that there is no evidence that Wittgenstein expected the 'we' to disappear, in the manner of Davidson, and that his affinities with relativistic trains of thought in fact go much deeper.
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页码：245 / 258
页数：14
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