The disparate adoption of price cap regulation in the US telecommunications and electricity sectors

被引：10

作者：

Sappington, David E. M. ^{[1
]}

Weisman, Dennis L. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Florida, Dept Econ, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA

[2] Kansas State Univ, Dept Econ, Manhattan, KS 66506 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 49卷 / 02期

关键词：

Price cap regulation; Telecommunications; Electricity; INCENTIVE REGULATION; X-FACTOR; EXPERIENCE; RETURN;

D O I：

10.1007/s11149-016-9295-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Price cap regulation (PCR) has experienced widespread adoption in the U.S. telecommunications industry, but not in the electricity sector. We suggest that these disparate experiences may reflect in part the manner in which PCR often is implemented in the U.S., relatively limited opportunity for "regulatory bargains" in the electricity sector, and relatively limited competition in the transmission and distribution components of this sector.

引用

页码：250 / 264

页数：15

共 64 条

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