Political Orientation Predicts Credulity Regarding Putative Hazards

被引:62
作者
Fessler, Daniel M. T. [1 ,2 ]
Pisor, Anne C. [3 ,4 ]
Holbrook, Colin [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Anthropol, 341 Haines Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Ctr Behav Evolut & Culture, 341 Haines Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[3] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Anthropol, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
[4] Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Anthropol, Dept Human Behav Ecol & Culture, Leipzig, Germany
关键词
threat sensitivity; negativity bias; negatively biased credulity; political orientation; open data; open materials; NEGATIVITY BIAS; MORAL FOUNDATIONS; AGE-DIFFERENCES; IDEOLOGY; CONSERVATISM; INFORMATION; PERSONALITY; TRANSMISSION; PREFERENCES; PREJUDICE;
D O I
10.1177/0956797617692108
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
To benefit from information provided by other people, people must be somewhat credulous. However, credulity entails risks. The optimal level of credulity depends on the relative costs of believing misinformation and failing to attend to accurate information. When information concerns hazards, erroneous incredulity is often more costly than erroneous credulity, given that disregarding accurate warnings is more harmful than adopting unnecessary precautions. Because no equivalent asymmetry exists for information concerning benefits, people should generally be more credulous of hazard information than of benefit information. This adaptive negatively biased credulity is linked to negativity bias in general and is more prominent among people who believe the world to be more dangerous. Because both threat sensitivity and beliefs about the dangerousness of the world differ between conservatives and liberals, we predicted that conservatism would positively correlate with negatively biased credulity. Two online studies of Americans supported this prediction, potentially illuminating how politicians' alarmist claims affect different portions of the electorate.
引用
收藏
页码:651 / 660
页数:10
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