Allocation and pricing at the water district level

被引:26
作者
Brill, E [1 ]
Hochman, E
Zilberman, D
机构
[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Agr Econ & Management, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
black rate pricing; efficient allocation; transferable rights; water agencies; water pricing;
D O I
10.2307/1244435
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
Efficient water pricing schemes are introduced for nonprofit water agencies, where members have property rights based upon historical usage. The existing average cost rate design is compared with the proposed designs, "active trading" and "passive trading." Both schemes lead to efficiency, but "passive trading" has operational advantages since it generates less transaction costs than "active trading." Block rate pricing is shown to be suboptimal and inferior to "passive trading." An example from the Israeli water economy is used as an empirical illustration.
引用
收藏
页码:952 / 963
页数:12
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