Selection games in economics

被引：15

作者：

Nie, Pu-yan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Jinan Univ, Dept Math, Guangzhou 510632, Peoples R China

来源：

APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2007年 / 14卷 / 03期

关键词：

EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; STACKELBERG GAMES;

D O I：

10.1080/13504850500425865

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, based on selection in finite populations, is recently proposed by Taylor et al. ( 2004) and it is successful to explain some phenomena in biology. We now extend this model to the economic field. Some corresponding results are also obtained and some economic phenomena are rationally explained.

引用

页码：223 / 225

页数：3

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