Unobserved punishment supports cooperation

被引：42

作者：

Fudenberg, Drew ^{[2
]}

Pathak, Parag A. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 94卷 / 1-2期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Public-goods experiments; PUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS; REPEATED GAMES; RECIPROCITY; CONFUSION; EVOLUTION; KINDNESS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.10.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Costly punishment can facilitate cooperation in public-goods games, as human subjects will incur costs to punish non-cooperators even in settings where it is unlikely that they will face the same opponents again Understanding when and Why it occurs is important both for the design of economic institutions and for modeling the evolution of cooperation Our experiment shows that subjects will engage in costly Punishment even when it will not be observed until the end of the session, which supports the view that agents enjoy punishment Moreover, players continue to cooperate when punishment is unobserved, perhaps because they (correctly) anticipate that shirkers will be punished. Fear of punishment can be as effective at promoting contributions as punishment itself (C) 2009 Elsevier B V All rights reserved

引用

页码：78 / 86

页数：9

共 30 条

[1] Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism [J].