Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule

被引:31
作者
Hokari, T
Thomson, W
机构
[1] Univ Tsukuba, Inst Social Sci, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 3068571, Japan
[2] Univ Rochester, Dept Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
关键词
claims problems; weighted generalizations of Talmud rule; consistency; converse consistency;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-002-0314-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate the existence of consistent rules for the resolution of conflicting claims that generalize the Talmud rule but do not necessarily satisfy equal treatment of equal. The first approach we follow starts from the description of the Talmud rule in the two-claimant case as "concede-and-divide", and an axiomatic characterization for the rule. When equal treatment of equals is dropped, we obtain a one-parameter family, "weighted concede-and-divide rules". The second approach starts from the description of the Talmud rule as a hybrid of the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, and weighted generalizations of these rules. We characterize the class of consistent rules that coincide with weighted concede-and-divide rules in the two-claimant case or with weighted hybrid rules. They are defined by partitioning the set of potential claimants into "priority classes" or "half-priority classes" respectively, and selecting reference weights for all potential claimants. For the first approach however, and in each class with more than two claimants, equal treatment is actually required.
引用
收藏
页码:241 / 261
页数:21
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