Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence

被引：34

作者：

Bayer, Ralph ^{[1
]}

Cowell, Frank ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Adelaide, Sch Econ, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia

[2] London Sch Econ, London, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 93卷 / 11-12期

关键词：

Tax compliance; Evasion; Oligopoly; EVASION; ECONOMICS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.07.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We focus on a relatively neglected area of the tax-compliance literature in economics, the behaviour of firms. We examine the impact of alternative audit rules on receipts from a tax on profits in the context of strategic interdependence of firms. The enforcement policy can have an effect on firms' behaviour in two dimensions their market decisions as well as their compliance behaviour. An appropriate design of the enforcement policy can thus have a "double dividend" by manipulating firms in both dimensions. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1131 / 1143

页数：13

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