Access Denied: How Equity Crowdfunding Platforms Use Quality Signals to Select New Ventures

被引:54
作者
Kleinert, Simon [1 ]
Bafera, Julian [2 ]
Urbig, Diemo [3 ,4 ]
Volkmann, Christine K. [2 ]
机构
[1] Maastricht Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Tongersestr 53, NL-6211 LM Maastricht, Netherlands
[2] Univ Wuppertal, Schumpeter Sch Business & Econ, Wuppertal, Germany
[3] Brandenburg Tech Univ Cottbus, Inst Business & Econ, Cottbus, Germany
[4] Indiana Univ, Inst Dev Strategies, Bloomington, IN USA
关键词
equity crowdfunding platforms; signaling; screening; entrepreneurial finance; crowdfunding; ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH; CAPITALISTS; PERFORMANCE; FOUNDERS; MARKET; FLEXIBILITY; DECISIONS; COUNTRIES; WINNERS; SUCCESS;
D O I
10.1177/10422587211011945
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Among the new ventures actively seeking funds through equity crowdfunding, only a lucky few seemingly survive the rigorous selection process imposed by equity crowdfunding platforms (ECFPs). With a conjoint experiment involving decision-makers from 50 platforms in 22 countries, this study provides first quantitative evidence regarding how ECFPs actually use quality signals to select new ventures to start fundraising campaigns. The ECFPs interpret signals differently, depending on whether they impose a co-investment requirement or generate revenues from new ventures' long-term performance. The effectiveness of the signals also is contingent on the applicant's industry background and the signals' accessibility in the country where the ECFP operates.
引用
收藏
页码:1626 / 1657
页数:32
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