Strategic delegation and voting rules

被引:29
作者
Harstad, Bard [1 ]
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, JL Kellogg Grad Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
关键词
Strategic delegation; Elections; Collective decisions; Voting rules; Political systems; Decentralization v centralization; MAJORITY RULES; LEGISLATURES; COALITIONS; POLITICS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.09.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The selection of political representatives depends on the political system Principals, such as voters or districts. may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from themselves While a status-quo biased delegate may be a better negotiator, an enthusiastic representative has a better chance of being Included in the majority coalition A larger majority requirement leads to "conservative" delegation an hence a Status quo bias, a poor minority protection does the opposite Through strategic delegation, the political system also determines whether centralization or decentralization is beneficial (C) 2009 Elsevier B V. All rights reserved
引用
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页码:102 / 113
页数:12
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