Macroeconomic Fluctuations as Sources of Luck in CEO Compensation

被引:13
作者
Chiu, Hsin-Hui [1 ]
Oxelheim, Lars [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Wihlborg, Clas [5 ]
Zhang, Jianhua [6 ]
机构
[1] Calif State Univ Northridge, Northridge, CA 91330 USA
[2] Lund Univ, Lund, Sweden
[3] Res Inst Ind Econ, Stockholm, Sweden
[4] Univ Agder, Kristiansand, Norway
[5] Chapman Univ, Orange, CA USA
[6] Univ Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
关键词
Macroeconomic fluctuations; Luck; Corporate performance; CEO compensation; Moral hazard; Managerial power; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; PAY;
D O I
10.1007/s10551-014-2520-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Macroeconomic fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation can be considered sources of good or bad "luck" for corporate performance if management is unable to adjust operations to these fluctuations. Based on a sample of 2,091 US firms, we decompose the impacts of macroeconomic fluctuations on three measures of CEO compensation. Our study provides empirical support for the importance of considering macroeconomic fluctuations in designing CEO incentive schemes. It adds to the managerial power literature on moral hazard and CEO compensation by pinpointing the obvious risk that the CEO in an asymmetric and non-linear reward system will be inclined to prioritize his/her own cash flow at the expense of fulfilling an assumed agency role. The policy conclusion for remuneration committees and board of directors is to filter out macroeconomic influences on performance to be rewarded whenever an asymmetric compensation scheme has been opted for.
引用
收藏
页码:371 / 384
页数:14
相关论文
共 26 条
[1]   DOES PERFORMANCE-BASED MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION AFFECT CORPORATE PERFORMANCE [J].
ABOWD, JM .
INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW, 1990, 43 (03) :S52-S73
[2]   Executive compensation, strategic competition, and relative performance evaluation: Theory and evidence [J].
Aggarwal, RK ;
Samwick, AA .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1999, 54 (06) :1999-2043
[3]  
[Anonymous], IND LABOR RELATIONS
[4]   AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF CORPORATE-EXECUTIVES [J].
ANTLE, R ;
SMITH, A .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1986, 24 (01) :1-39
[5]   The growth of executive pay [J].
Bebchuk, L ;
Grinstein, Y .
OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 2005, 21 (02) :283-303
[6]   Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues [J].
Bebchuk, Lucian A. ;
Fried, Jesse M. .
JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, 2005, 17 (04) :8-+
[7]   Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are [J].
Bertrand, M ;
Mullainathan, S .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2001, 116 (03) :901-932
[8]   Agents with and without principals [J].
Bertrand, M ;
Mullainathan, S .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2000, 90 (02) :203-208
[9]   Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation? [J].
Bizjak, John M. ;
Lemmon, Michael L. ;
Naveen, Lalitha .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2008, 90 (02) :152-168
[10]   EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION, MANAGEMENT TURNOVER, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE - AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION [J].
COUGHLAN, AT ;
SCHMIDT, RM .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1985, 7 (1-3) :43-66