Institutional Investors' Shareholding and Equity Cost-Empirical Evidence from Chinese Security Market

被引：0

作者：

Fan Haifeng ^{[1
]}

Hu Yuming ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Jinan Univ, Sch Management, Guangzhou 510632, Guangdong, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, BOOKS 1 AND 2 | 2009年

关键词：

Institutional investor; corporate governance; corporate systematic risk; equity costs; OWNERSHIP;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Corporate equity cost can represent the level of corporate proxy cost efficiently. The paper studied the impact of institutional investor shareholding on corporate governance by equity cost. The empirical result verifies that when controlling corporate size, there is a highly notable negative relation between institutional investors' shareholding and corporate systematic risk, institutional investors' shareholding and corporate equity cost, thus verifies that as institutional investors have advantage in size, information and personnel, they can monitor corporate efficiently, thus decrease proxy cost, corporate systematic risk and equity cost.

引用

页码：465 / 470

页数：6