Political institutions and economic development over more than a century

被引:3
作者
Nistico, Roberto [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Naples Federico II, Via Cintia Monte S Angelo, I-80126 Naples, Italy
[2] CSEF, Dept Econ & Stat, Via Cintia Monte S Angelo, I-80126 Naples, Italy
关键词
Democracy; Economic development; Education; Institutions; DEMOCRACY; GROWTH; RULE; PERFORMANCE; CULTURE; PRODUCE; INCOME; LAW;
D O I
10.1016/j.strueco.2022.02.013
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Economists and political scientists have long investigated the effect of political institutions on economic development, mainly focusing on cross-sectional analyses for the years after World War II. This paper takes a historical perspective and studies whether this effect can be traced back to 1870 and how it changed over time. Using both cross-sectional and panel fixed effects regressions, I show that democracy positively affects income per capita in the post-1950 period. The effect increases as time passes and becomes especially larger after 1990, i.e. with the great democratization wave induced by the Fall of the Iron Curtain. Yet, I find no effect for the period before 1950, when the variation in income per capita is mostly explained by prior income levels, and in particular, by education. These findings are robust to accounting for income dynamics as well as to using different data sources to measure political institutions.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:199 / 215
页数:17
相关论文
共 49 条
[1]   The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation [J].
Acemoglu, D ;
Johnson, S ;
Robinson, JA .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2001, 91 (05) :1369-1401
[2]   Persistence of power, elites, and institutions [J].
Acemoglu, Daron ;
Robinson, James A. .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2008, 98 (01) :267-293
[3]   Democracy Does Cause Growth [J].
Acemoglu, Daron ;
Naidu, Suresh ;
Restrepo, Pascual ;
Robinson, James A. .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2019, 127 (01) :47-100
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2000, DEMOCRACY DEV POLITI
[5]  
[Anonymous], 2005, Handbook of Economic Growth, DOI [DOI 10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01006-3, 10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01006-3]
[6]   History, institutions, and economic performance: The legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India [J].
Banerjee, A ;
Iyer, L .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2005, 95 (04) :1190-1213
[7]   Determinants of democracy [J].
Barro, RJ .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1999, 107 (06) :S158-S183
[8]   Religion and economic growth across countries [J].
Barro, RJ ;
McCleary, RM .
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2003, 68 (05) :760-781
[9]   A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-2007 [J].
Boix, Carles ;
Miller, Michael ;
Rosato, Sebastian .
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 2013, 46 (12) :1523-1554
[10]  
Buchanan J., 1998, Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Toward Nondiscriminatory Democracy