Nash equilibrium in strictly competitive games: live play in soccer

被引:18
作者
Moschini, GC [1 ]
机构
[1] Iowa State Univ, Dept Econ, Ames, IA 50011 USA
关键词
mixed strategies; Nash equilibrium; soccer;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2004.06.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
I model a scoring situation that arises frequently during soccer matches. The Nash equilibrium solution is shown to be broadly consistent with the conventional wisdom of experts. Data on goals scored over an entire season in Italy's soccer league provide statistical support for a prediction of the model's Nash equilibrium. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:365 / 371
页数:7
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