Corporate Governance in China: a Step Forward

被引:55
作者
Cheung, Yan-Leung [1 ]
Jiang, Ping [1 ]
Limpaphayom, Piman [2 ]
Lu, Tong [3 ]
机构
[1] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Chulalongkorn Univ, Sasin Grad Inst Business Adm, Bangkok 10330, Thailand
[3] Chinese Acad Social Sci, Chinese Ctr Corp Governance, Beijing, Peoples R China
关键词
corporate governance; China; G3; G34; MARKET VALUATION; AGENCY PROBLEMS; PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; DETERMINANTS; INCENTIVES; DISCLOSURE; DIRECTORS; REFORM; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-036X.2008.00446.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Recently, the presumed benefits of corporate governance have become one of the most contentious issues especially for emerging markets in Asia where institutional settings are quite different from other parts of the world. Using an internationally accepted benchmark (OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD, 2004), this study evaluates the progress of corporate governance practice of Chinese listed companies. A corporate governance index (CGI) is constructed to measure the quality of corporate governance practices of the 100 largest listed firms in China during 2004-2006. The results show that Chinese companies have been making progress in the corporate governance reform. The findings also show a positive relation between market valuation and overall corporate governance practices, as measured by the CGI, among these Chinese listed companies. Additional investigation reveals that the rights of shareholders are the main driver in the relationship.
引用
收藏
页码:94 / 123
页数:30
相关论文
共 44 条
[11]  
Black Bernard., 2001, EMERG MARK REV, V2, P89, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1566-0141(01)00012-7
[12]   Does corporate governance predict firms' market values? Evidence from Korea [J].
Black, Bernard S. ;
Jang, Hasung ;
Kim, Woochan .
JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 2006, 22 (02) :366-413
[13]  
BRAINARD WC, 1968, AM ECON REV, V58, P99
[14]   What determines corporate transparency? [J].
Bushman, RM ;
Piotroski, JD ;
Smith, AJ .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2004, 42 (02) :207-252
[15]   Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong [J].
Cheung, Yan-Leung ;
Rau, P. Raghavendra ;
Stouraitis, Aris .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 82 (02) :343-386
[16]  
CHEUNG YL, 2007, INT FINANCIAL MANAGE, V18, P86
[17]   Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings [J].
Claessens, S ;
Djankov, S ;
Fan, JPH ;
Lang, LHP .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2002, 57 (06) :2741-2771
[18]  
Connelly J.T., 2004, The Journal of Corporate Citizenship, V13, P137, DOI [DOI 10.9774/GLEAF.4700.2004.SP.000015, https://doi.org/10.9774/GLEAF.4700.2004.sp.000015]
[19]   Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? [J].
Cotter, JF ;
Shivdasani, A ;
Zenner, M .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1997, 43 (02) :195-218
[20]   To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal environment, and valuation [J].
Durnev, A ;
Kim, EH .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2005, 60 (03) :1461-1493