Epistemic injustice - The third way?

被引：4

作者：

Marshall, SE ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Stirling, Dept Philosophy, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland

来源：

METAPHILOSOPHY | 2003年 / 34卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

epistemic injustice; loyalty; testimonial sensibility; virtue;

D O I：

10.1111/1467-9973.00267

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

In response to Miranda Fricker's advocacy of a virtue of 'reflexive critical openness', I emphasize the importance of other virtues, such as loyalty, in evaluating an agent's response to testimony, and I query Fricker's claim that in certain circumstances agents can lack a means to correct their faulty evaluations of another's testimony.

引用

页码：174 / 177

页数：4