Game Analysis of Supervision Staff's Stress Management

被引:0
作者
Dong Ping [1 ]
Zheng Weifeng [2 ]
机构
[1] Luoyang Inst Technol, Luoyang 471000, Henan, Peoples R China
[2] China Univ Min & Technol Beijing, Beijing 10083, Peoples R China
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF 2009 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONSTRUCTION & REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT, VOLS 1 AND 2 | 2009年
关键词
supervision enterprise; stress management; game theory; Nash equilibrium;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Construction supervision enterprise has become one of the main bodies in the construction market. Supervision staffs shoulder functions of supervision, management, organization, coordination and so on. Their job stresses not only have universality, but also high flow ability and high load capacity. Whether they are able bear theses challenges directly affects the survival and development of the construction supervision enterprise. To achieve better and faster development of construction supervision enterprise, the relationship between supervision enterprise and supervision staff and the relationship among supervision enterprises are deeply analyzed by means of static game of sufficient information. Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of these two relationships is obtained. It is analyzed that it is necessary to have stress management for construction supervision enterprise to well survive and develop. It is concluded that stress management is an important measure for construction supervision enterprise to adapt to market economy.
引用
收藏
页码:508 / +
页数:2
相关论文
共 7 条
  • [1] [Anonymous], 2003, An Introduction to Game Theory
  • [2] DONG P, 2008, 2008 INT C PROD OP M, V7, P75
  • [3] Myerson R., 2001, GAME THEORY ANAL CON
  • [4] Robert G., 1999, A Primer in Game Theory
  • [5] SHI XQ, 2000, GAME THEORY
  • [6] Xie S Y., 2002, Economic Game Theory
  • [7] ZHANG WY, 1996, GAMES INFORM EC