A new moral sentimentalism

被引：1

作者：

Vogelstein, Eric ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Duquesne Univ, Dept Philosophy, Pittsburgh, PA 15219 USA

[2] Duquesne Univ, Sch Nursing, Pittsburgh, PA 15219 USA

来源：

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2016年 / 46卷 / 03期

关键词：

Sentimentalism; moral emotion; compassion; respect; moral reasons; REASONS; RATIONALITY; EMOTIONS;

D O I：

10.1080/00455091.2016.1169383

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

This paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.

引用

页码：346 / 368

页数：23

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