The Ties That Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War

被引:8
作者
Abbs, Luke [1 ]
Clayton, Govinda [2 ]
Thomson, Andrew [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Essex, ESRC Business & Local Govt Data Res Ctr, Colchester Campus, Colchester, Essex, England
[2] Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Ctr Secur Studies, C 29-1,Haldeneggsteig 4, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland
[3] Queens Univ Belfast, Sch Hist Anthropol Philosophy & Polit, Belfast, Antrim, North Ireland
关键词
ethnicity; pro-government militia; counterinsurgency; civil war; conflict intensity; conflict duration; ARMED CONFLICT; STATE; DURATION; DEFECTION; POLITICS; ENEMY; SHADOW; RISE;
D O I
10.1177/0022002719883684
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Existing research reveals many of the ways pro-government militia (PGM) shape civil violence but overlooks how the ethno-political ties between the state and a PGM might influence these effects. We argue that co-ethnic militia (i.e., groups composed of the ruling elite's ethnic kin) are relatively loyal irregular forces that multiply state military capacity. The greater loyalty of co-ethnic groups mitigates principal-agent problems but further polarizes ethnic communities, and as a result, co-ethnic PGMs are likely to be associated with longer and more intense civil conflict. We test this argument on a global sample of cases from 1989 to 2007 using new data capturing the ethnic ties of all PGMs. The results support our claims that co-ethnic militia are associated with more intense and longer civil conflict.
引用
收藏
页码:903 / 932
页数:30
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