An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism

被引:7
作者
Pritchard, D [1 ]
Kallestrup, J
机构
[1] Univ Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland
[2] Univ St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland
关键词
Content Externalism; Epistemic Internalism;
D O I
10.1007/BF02385190
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码:345 / 354
页数:10
相关论文
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