Research on the Principal-Agent Game of Multi-incentive Mechanism for DB Subcontract in CSPC

The importance of cooperative relationship of construction supply project chain (CSPC) in design-building (DB) contract is due to subcontractor's decision making of the resource distribution and multi-objectives control behavior influences the entire performance as agent of the subcontract project. And one of the main risk resources is from the moral hazard and opportunism behavior of subcontractors. However, the existing single-factor incentive system can not deal with the corporation of project multi-objectives control for the whole CSPC. Therefore, based on the principal-agent game, this paper establishes the multi-objective incentive model from the angle of general contractor to subcontract and analyzes the solution procedure. The incentive strategy of the multi-objective subcontract is presented either to improve the income of both the GC and the subcontractor. These conclusions can be helpful in the mechanism design of procurement contract and subcontract.