Does communication influence executives' opinion of central bank policy? q

被引:1
作者
Hwang, In Do [1 ]
Lustenberger, Thomas [2 ]
Rossi, Enzo [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Bank Korea, Seoul, South Korea
[2] Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Author FINMA, Bern, Switzerland
[3] Swiss Natl Bank, Bern, Switzerland
[4] Univ Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
Central bank communication; Economic impact; Perceived competence and trust in central; banks; Panel data; Executive survey; MONETARY-POLICY; SOCIAL VALUE; TRANSPARENCY; INFORMATION; TRUST; INDEPENDENCE; CREDIBILITY; INVESTMENT; FUTURE; ECB;
D O I
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2021.102393
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We analyze the economic impact of central banks sensed by business executives in a sample of 61 countries from 1998 to 2016. Based on a survey conducted by the Institute for Management Development (IMD), we find compelling evidence that intensive central bank communication, as measured by the quantity of speeches, worsens the perceived impact. During the global financial crisis (GFC), this effect became even stronger. In contrast, economic growth and a positive output gap improve the opinion executives have of their central bank's impact on the economy. Moreover, although less robustly, higher unemployment, and higher short-term interest rates worsen executives' opinion, while market uncertainty improves it. The level of inflation and an inflation targeting regime, central bank independence and transparency, financial crises, the zero lower bound constraint, forward guidance, the performance of the stock market, and the volatility of the exchange rate seem to be unimportant in this regard. A more detailed analysis shows that the effect of speeches depends on the identity of the speaker, the exchange-rate regime or an explicit employment mandate. (c) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页数:23
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