Mutual fund performance, management teams, and boards

被引:26
作者
Adams, John C. [1 ]
Nishikawa, Takeshi [2 ]
Rao, Ramesh P. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Arlington, Coll Business, Arlington, TX 76019 USA
[2] Univ Colorado Denver, Business Sch, Denver, CO USA
[3] Oklahoma State Univ, Spears Sch Business, Stillwater, OK 74078 USA
关键词
Mutual funds; Board structure; Organizational structure; Management teams; STRATEGIC CHANGE; WORK TEAMS; DIRECTORS; LEADERSHIP; TURNOVER; INDUSTRY; IMPACT; FIRMS; SIZE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.09.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The recent surge in the use of team-managed funds in the mutual fund industry suggests that the benefits of team management might outweigh its costs. However, extant empirical evidence is not consistent with the view that team-managed funds generate superior returns relative to individual-managed funds. We argue that the benefits of team management are likely to be manifested in the presence of strong board monitoring because the potential free-rider problems within team-managed funds are alleviated. Our findings, that smaller boards and boards with a higher proportion of independent directors are positively associated with performance in team but not individual-managed funds, are consistent with this view. Our results suggest that in team-managed fund structures, where the potential free-riding problems exist, the presence of strong board monitoring improves fund performance. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:358 / 368
页数:11
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