A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games

被引：6

作者：

Barbera, Salvador

Gerber, Anke

机构：

[1] Univ Zurich, Swiss Banking Inst, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland

[2] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, Dept Econ & Hist Econ, Bellaterra 08193, Barcelona, Spain

[3] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, CODE, Bellaterra 08193, Barcelona, Spain

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2007年 / 95卷 / 01期

关键词：

hedonic game; coalition formation; stability;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.018

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：85 / 90

页数：6

共 9 条

[1] Core in a simple coalition formation game [J].