Job search and unemployment insurance: New evidence from time use data

被引:128
作者
Krueger, Alan B. [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Mueller, Andreas [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Stockholm Univ, Inst Int Econ Studies, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden
[2] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08540 USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] Princeton Univ, Woodrow Wilson Sch, Princeton, NJ 08540 USA
关键词
Unemployment; Unemployment insurance; Job search; Time use; Unemployment benefits; Inequality; LABOR-MARKET; BENEFITS; STATES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.12.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper provides new evidence on job search intensity of the unemployed in the U.S., modeling job search intensity as time allocated to job search activities. The major findings are: 1) the average U.S. unemployed worker devotes about 41 min to job search on weekdays, which is substantially more than their European counterparts; 2) workers who expect to be recalled by their previous employer search substantially less than the average unemployed worker; 3) across the 50 states and D.C., job search is inversely related to the generosity of unemployment benefits, with an elasticity between -1.6 and -2.2; 4) job search intensity for those eligible for Unemployment Insurance (UI) increases prior to benefit exhaustion: and 5) time devoted to job search is fairly constant regardless of unemployment duration for those who are ineligible for UI. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:298 / 307
页数:10
相关论文
共 20 条
[1]  
ANDERSON P, 2001, OECD P LABOUR MARKET
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1986, 1825 NBER
[3]   SEARCH EFFORT IN THE LABOR-MARKET [J].
BARRON, JM ;
MELLOW, W .
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES, 1979, 14 (03) :389-404
[4]   The spike at benefit exhaustion: Leaving the unemployment system or starting a new job? [J].
Card, David ;
Chetty, Raj ;
Weber, Andrea .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2007, 97 (02) :113-118
[5]   Moral hazard versus liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance [J].
Chetty, Raj .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2008, 116 (02) :173-234
[6]   UNEMPLOYMENT-INSURANCE AND RESERVATION WAGES [J].
FELDSTEIN, M ;
POTERBA, J .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1984, 23 (1-2) :141-167
[7]   TEMPORARY LAYOFFS IN THEORY OF UNEMPLOYMENT [J].
FELDSTEIN, M .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1976, 84 (05) :937-957
[8]   ARE UNEMPLOYMENT AND OUT OF THE LABOR-FORCE BEHAVIORALLY DISTINCT LABOR-FORCE STATES [J].
FLINN, CJ ;
HECKMAN, JJ .
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1983, 1 (01) :28-42
[9]   THE IMPACT OF THE POTENTIAL DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS ON THE DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT [J].
KATZ, LF ;
MEYER, BD .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1990, 41 (01) :45-72
[10]   UNEMPLOYMENT-INSURANCE, RECALL EXPECTATIONS, AND UNEMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES [J].
KATZ, LF ;
MEYER, BD .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1990, 105 (04) :973-1002