Civil liability and the 50%+ standard of proof

被引:5
作者
Smith, Martin [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Edinburgh, Philosophy, 3 Charles St, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, Midlothian, Scotland
基金
英国艺术与人文研究理事会;
关键词
base rate fallacy; burden of proof; civil liability; naked statistical evidence; normic support; preponderance of evidence; principle of equality; probability; relative plausibility; NAKED STATISTICAL EVIDENCE; BASE-RATE FALLACY; BURDENS;
D O I
10.1177/13657127211011207
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
The standard of proof applied in civil trials is the preponderance of evidence, often said to be met when a proposition is shown to be more than 50% likely to be true. A number of theorists have argued that this 50%+ standard is too weak-there are circumstances in which a court should find that the defendant is not liable, even though the evidence presented makes it more than 50% likely that the plaintiff's claim is true. In this paper, I will recapitulate the familiar arguments for this thesis, before defending a more radical one: The 50%+ standard is also too strong-there are circumstances in which a court should find that a defendant is liable, even though the evidence presented makes it less than 50% likely that the plaintiff's claim is true. I will argue that the latter thesis follows naturally from the former once we accept that the parties in a civil trial are to be treated equally. I will conclude by sketching an alternative interpretation of the civil standard of proof
引用
收藏
页码:183 / 199
页数:17
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