Mixed Linear Quadratic Stochastic Differential Leader-Follower Game with Input Constraint

被引:9
作者
Xie, Tinghan [1 ]
Feng, Xinwei [2 ]
Huang, Jianhui [1 ]
机构
[1] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Appl Math, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Shandong Univ, Zhongtai Secur Inst Financial Studies, Jinan 250100, Shandong, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Mixed leader-follower problem; Stochastic differential game; Input constraint; Singular control weight; Forward-backward stochastic differential equation; VARIANCE PORTFOLIO SELECTION; OPEN-LOOP; UTILITY MAXIMIZATION; STACKELBERG SOLUTION; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1007/s00245-021-09767-7
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
This paper investigates a mixed leader-follower differential games problem, where the model involves two players with the same hierarchy in decision making and each player has two controls which act as a leader and a follower, respectively. Specifically, we solve a follower problem with unconstrained controls and obtain the corresponding Nash equilibrium. Then a leader problem with constrained controls is tackled and a pair of optimal constrained controls are presented by a projection mapping. Furthermore, the control weights are allowed to be singular. In this case, we first investigate the uniform convexity of the cost functional whose corresponding states are fully-coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equation. After that, the minimizing sequence of solutions with non-degenerate control weights are constructed to study the weak convergence of the corresponding cost functionals. Finally, two examples are addressed for non-singular and singular cases, respectively.
引用
收藏
页码:S215 / S251
页数:37
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