Do exogenous changes in passive institutional ownership affect corporate governance and firm value?

被引：186

作者：

Schmidt, Cornelius ^{[1
,2
]}

Fahlenbrach, Ruediger ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Norwegian Sch Econ NHH, Dept Finance, N-5045 Bergen, Norway

[2] European Commiss, Directorate Gen Competit, MADO 17-055, Brussels, Belgium

[3] Ecole Polytech Fed Lausanne, Swiss Finance Inst, Quartier UNIL Dorigny, Extranef 211, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 124卷 / 02期

基金：

瑞士国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Corporate governance; Institutional ownership; Monitoring; Index reconstitutions; FREE CASH FLOW; REGRESSION-DISCONTINUITY; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; POWERFUL CEOS; FUND ACTIVISM; FOUNDER-CEOS; PERFORMANCE; INVESTORS; DIRECTORS; RETURNS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.01.005

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We investigate whether corporations and their executives react to an exogenous change in passive institutional ownership and alter their corporate governance structure. We find that exogenous increases in passive ownership lead to increases in CEO power and fewer new independent director appointments. Consistent with these changes not being beneficial for shareholders, we observe negative announcement returns to the appointments of new independent directors. We also show that firms carry out worse mergers and acquisitions after exogenous increases in passive ownership. These results suggest that the changed ownership structure causes higher agency costs. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：285 / 306

页数：22

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