A Theory of Corporate Boards and Forced CEO Turnover

被引：23
作者：
Chemmanur, Thomas J. [1 ]
Fedaseyeu, Viktar [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Boston Coll, Carroll Sch Management, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA
[2] Bocconi Univ, I-20136 Milan, Italy
[3] IGIER, I-20136 Milan, Italy
来源：
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2018年 / 64卷 / 10期
关键词：
CEO turnover; board of directors; board member discussions; corporate governance; INFORMATION; DIRECTORS; GOVERNANCE; SIZE; DETERMINANTS; MARKET; COMMUNICATION; COMPANIES; SIGNALS; ISSUES;
D O I：
10.1287/mnsc.2017.2762
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We model a corporate board evaluating a chief executive officer (CEO) of uncertain management ability. Each director receives a noisy private signal about CEO ability, after which directors discuss this ability and vote to retain or replace the CEO. Directors care about true CEO ability, since it affects their equity holding values; however, a CEO may impose costs of dissent on a director who votes to fire but fails to oust her. We relate the equilibrium CEO firing decision to board size, board composition, the effect of an imprecise public signal, and the cost and probability of finding a good replacement CEO.
引用
收藏
页码：4798 / 4817
页数：20
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