Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis

被引：724

作者：

Johnson, S ^{[1
]}

Boone, P

Breach, A

Friedman, E

机构：

[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[2] Brunswick UBS Warburg, Moscow, Russia

[3] Goldman Sachs, Moscow, Russia

[4] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Econ, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2000年 / 58卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

corporate governance; investor protection; financial crisis;

D O I：

10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00069-6

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

The "Asian Crisis" of 1997-98 affected all the "emerging markets" open to capital flows. Measures of corporate governance, particularly the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders, explain the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock market decline better than do standard macroeconomic measures. A possible explanation is that in countries with weak corporate governance, worse economic prospects result in more expropriation by managers and thus a larger fall in asset prices. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G18; G38; K22.

引用

页码：141 / 186

页数：46