Does employee welfare affect corporate debt maturity?

被引:27
作者
Boubaker, Sabri [1 ,2 ]
Chourou, Lamia [3 ]
Haddar, Marwa [2 ]
Hamza, Taher [4 ]
机构
[1] EM Normandie Business Sch, Metis Lab, Paris, France
[2] Paris Est Creteil Univ, IRG, Creteil, France
[3] Univ Ottawa, Telfer Sch Management, Ottawa, ON, Canada
[4] Univ Carthage, IHEC Carthage, Tunis, Tunisia
关键词
Employee well-being; Employee welfare; Stakeholders; Debt maturity; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT-PRACTICES; SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; LIQUIDITY RISK; DETERMINANTS; INFORMATION; PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP; POLICY; LABOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.emj.2019.08.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study examines the effect of employee well-being on the corporate debt maturity structure of U.S. firms. It hypothesizes that a firm's degree of commitment to employee welfare affects its debt maturity structure. Using a sample of 19,347 firm-year observations over the period 1991-2014, we find evidence that firms with higher employee welfare scores prefer long-term debt over short-term debt. This relationship is more pronounced for firms operating in human-capital-intensive industries and firms with lower labor union-membership rate. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns and insensitive to the use of alternative regression methods, variable measurements, and sample compositions. This paper provides novel evidence on the role of employment policies and practices in explaining variations in debt maturity. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:674 / 686
页数:13
相关论文
共 71 条
[1]  
Abdulla Y., 2015, REV QUANTITATIVE FIN, V45, P1
[2]  
Akerlof G. A., 1986, EFFICIENCY WAGE MODE
[3]  
Almeida H., 2009, W14990 NAT BUR EC RE
[4]   Employee treatment and firm leverage: A test of the stakeholder theory of capital structure [J].
Bae, Kee-Hong ;
Kang, Jun-Koo ;
Wang, Jin .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2011, 100 (01) :130-153
[5]   Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans [J].
Bae, Kee-Hong ;
Goyal, Vidhan K. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2009, 64 (02) :823-860
[6]   THE MATURITY STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE-DEBT [J].
BARCLAY, MJ ;
SMITH, CW .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1995, 50 (02) :609-631
[7]   A RATIONALE FOR DEBT MATURITY STRUCTURE AND CALL PROVISIONS IN THE AGENCY THEORETIC FRAMEWORK [J].
BARNEA, A ;
HAUGEN, RA ;
SENBET, LW .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1980, 35 (05) :1223-1234
[8]   Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict Between Shareholders [J].
Barnea, Amir ;
Rubin, Amir .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS, 2010, 97 (01) :71-86
[9]   Labor protection and corporate Debt maturity: International evidence [J].
Belkhir, Mohamed ;
Ben-Nasr, Hamdi ;
Boubaker, Sabri .
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, 2016, 45 :134-149
[10]   Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity [J].
Ben-Nasr, Hamdi ;
Boubaker, Sabri ;
Rouatbi, Wael .
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2015, 35 :265-285