The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games

被引：65

作者：

Ju, Yuan ^{[1
]}

Borm, Peter

Ruys, Pieter

机构：

[1] Univ Keele, Sch Econ & Management Studies, Keele ST5 5BG, Staffs, England

[2] Tilburg Univ, CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

[3] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econometr & Operat Res, TILEC, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

[4] Tilburg Univ, Tias Business Sch, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2007年 / 28卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

To generalize the standard solution for 2-person TU games into n-person cases, this paper introduces a recursive two-sided negotiation process to establish cooperation between all players. This leads to a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. An explicit comparison with the Shapley value is provided, also at the axiomatic level. Moreover, a class of possible generalizations of the consensus value is introduced and axiomatized with the Shapley value at one end and the equal surplus solution at the other. Finally, we discuss a non-cooperative mechanism which implements the consensus value.

引用

页码：685 / 703

页数：19

共 17 条

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