Managerial succession and firm performance

被引：407

作者：

Huson, MR

Malatesta, PH

Parrino, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Alberta, Sch Business, Dept Finance & Management Sci, Edmonton, AB T6G 2R6, Canada

[2] Univ Washington, Sch Business, Dept Finance & Business Econ, Seattle, WA 98195 USA

[3] Univ Texas, McCombs Sch Business, Dept Finance, Austin, TX 78712 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2004年 / 74卷 / 02期

关键词：

corporate governance; CEO turnover; CEO succession; firm performance;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.08.002

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine CEO turnover and firm financial performance. Accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate prior to CEO turnover and improve thereafter. The degree of improvement is positively related to the level of institutional shareholdings, the presence of an outsider-dominated board, and the appointment of an outsider (rather than an insider) CEO. Turnover announcements are associated with significantly positive average abnormal stock returns, which are in turn significantly positively related to subsequent changes in accounting measures of performance. This suggests that investors view turnover announcements as good news presaging performance improvements. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：237 / 275

页数：39

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