THE EFFECT OF CEO PAY DEVIATIONS ON CEO WITHDRAWAL, FIRM SIZE, AND FIRM PROFITS

被引：95
作者：
Fong, Eric A. [1 ]
Misangyi, Vilmos F. [2 ]
Tosi, Henry L., Jr. [3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Alabama, Coll Business Adm, Dept Management & Mkt, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
[2] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, Dept Management & Org, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
[3] Univ Florida, Dept Management, Warrington Coll Business Adm, Gainesville, FL USA
[4] Bocconi Univ, Sch Management, Strategy & Entrepreneurship Management Dept, Milan, Italy
来源：
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 2010年 / 31卷 / 06期
关键词：
CEO compensation; CEO turnover; CEO power; equity; labor markets; overpayment; TOP MANAGEMENT; MANAGERIAL REMUNERATION; EQUITY THEORY; PERFORMANCE; COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP; CONSEQUENCES; DETERMINANT; STRATEGY; GROWTH;
D O I：
10.1002/smj.827
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner-controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager-controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for Mitre research. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码：629 / 651
页数：23
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