Bargaining models in opinion dynamics

被引：2
作者：
Zheng, Xi [1 ,2 ]
Lu, Xi [1 ,2 ]
Chan, Felix T. S. [3 ]
Deng, Yong [2 ,4 ]
Wang, Zhen [5 ,6 ]
机构：
[1] Southwest Univ, Sch Hanhong, Chongqing 400715, Peoples R China
[2] Southwest Univ, Sch Comp & Informat Sci, Chongqing 400715, Peoples R China
[3] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Ind & Syst Engn, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Automat, Xian 710072, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[5] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Dept Phys, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[6] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Ctr Nonlinear Studies & Beijing Hong Kong Singapo, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
来源：
APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION | 2015年 / 251卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金; 国家高技术研究发展计划(863计划);
关键词：
Consensus; Bargaining power; Game theory; Bayesian updating rule; CONSENSUS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.amc.2014.11.053
中图分类号：
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号：
070104 ;
摘要：
How to reach consensus is the central problem in the research of opinion dynamics. Here we propose the bargaining models under the framework of game theory to involve the non-linearity of opinion dynamics. In this new setup, a dynamic bargaining power is presented to represent the individual difference, which can help to evaluate the profit of changing opinion. Moreover, two types of bargaining models are proposed due to the difference of choosing neighbors. Via numerous simulations, it is unveiled that, with an appropriate environment, both models could lead to the consensus in majority cases, which further enriches the context of opinion dynamics. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：162 / 168
页数：7
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