When considering whether to adopt a network technology, how does uncertainty about whom a potential adopter might interact with affect their adoption choice? On the one hand, uncertainty about potential network partners might enhance adoption incentives, as increased uncertainty induces the potential for economies of scope across the potential network. On the other hand, uncertainty may reduce the expected value of any particular connection, and reduce adoption incentives. Since this is a theoretical puzzle, this chapter presents empirical evidence to help illuminate it. It presents evidence the destabilizing of a social network may increase the scope of network externalities, using data on sales of a video-calling system made to an investment bank's employees and subsequent usage by these customers. The terrorist attacks of 2001 led potential customers in New York to start communicating with a new and less predictable set of people when their work teams were reorganized as a result of the physical displacement that resulted from the attacks. This did not happen in other comparable cities. These destabilized communication patterns were associated with potential adopters in New York being more likely to take into account a wider spectrum of the user base when deciding whether to adopt relative to those in other cities. Empirical analysis suggests that the aggregate effect of network externalities on adoption was doubled by this instability, and that for those with diffuse networks, this more than compensated for the negative baseline effects of the instability.
机构:
Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Ctr Econ Performance, London WC2A 2AE, England
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAStanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[7]
Farrell J., 2007, Handbook of Industrial Organization, V3, P1967, DOI [10.1016/S1573-448X(06)03031-7, DOI 10.1016/S1573-448X(06)03031-7, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-448X(06)03031-7]
机构:
Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Ctr Econ Performance, London WC2A 2AE, England
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAStanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[7]
Farrell J., 2007, Handbook of Industrial Organization, V3, P1967, DOI [10.1016/S1573-448X(06)03031-7, DOI 10.1016/S1573-448X(06)03031-7, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-448X(06)03031-7]