Active Defense Technology of Power Monitoring System With Adaptive Features

被引:3
作者
Liu, Wei [1 ]
Yao, Yiyang [2 ]
Zhao, Baohua [3 ]
Yang, Weiyong [1 ]
Qi, Longyun [1 ]
Lv, Xiaoliang [1 ]
机构
[1] NARI Grp Corp, State Grid Elect Power Res Inst, Nanjing 210003, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] State Grid Zhejiang Elect Power Co Ltd, Hangzhou 310007, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
[3] Global Energy Interconnect Res Inst Co Ltd, Beijing 100209, Peoples R China
来源
IEEE ACCESS | 2018年 / 6卷
关键词
Power monitoring system; security immunity; active defense; operating system ontology security;
D O I
10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2870116
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Internet of Things has found a lot of applications in power systems. However, with the increased the sensing, networking, and control capabilities, the security issues have become even more urgent at the same time. In this paper, a TMAC model based on trusted mandatory access control is proposed by studying the security situation of a power monitoring system. The model has self-learning characteristic and can realize the automatic escalation of the global security strategy based on intelligent agent, so as to build the safe immune ability and active defense system for the power monitoring. This paper introduces the key technology of the TMAC security model, formalizes some of the work, and finally tests its credibility and effectiveness for the typical application scenario of the power monitoring system. Through the study of this technology, the power monitoring system is further equipped with an immune ability against virus Trojan and hacker attacks, especially for application scenarios, such as substation, power plant, and master station.
引用
收藏
页码:57778 / 57786
页数:9
相关论文
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