Conditional cash transfers, public provision of private goods, and income redistribution

[1] BESLEY T, 1991, AM ECON REV, V81, P979

[2] BESLEY T, 1992, AM ECON REV, V82, P249

[3] BLACKORBY C, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P691

[4] Public provision of private goods as a redistributive device in an optimum income tax model [J]. SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1995, 97 (04) : 547 - 567

[5] THE USE OF PUBLIC-EXPENDITURES FOR REDISTRIBUTIVE PURPOSES [J]. OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 1995, 47 (01): : 45 - 59

[6] Bourguignon Francois, 2002, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Nr. 2916

[7] In-kind transfers, self-selection and optimal tax policy [J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1997, 41 (01) : 97 - 114

[8] Das Jishnu, 2004, [No title captured]

[9] IN-KIND VERSUS CASH TRANSFERS IN THE PRESENCE OF DISTORTIONARY TAXES [J]. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1995, 33 (01) : 45 - 53

[10] IN-KIND TRANSFERS, CASH GRANTS AND LABOR SUPPLY [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1994, 55 (03) : 495 - 504

[1] BESLEY T, 1991, AM ECON REV, V81, P979

[2] BESLEY T, 1992, AM ECON REV, V82, P249

[3] BLACKORBY C, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P691

[4] Public provision of private goods as a redistributive device in an optimum income tax model [J]. SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1995, 97 (04) : 547 - 567

[5] THE USE OF PUBLIC-EXPENDITURES FOR REDISTRIBUTIVE PURPOSES [J]. OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 1995, 47 (01): : 45 - 59

[6] Bourguignon Francois, 2002, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Nr. 2916

[7] In-kind transfers, self-selection and optimal tax policy [J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1997, 41 (01) : 97 - 114

[8] Das Jishnu, 2004, [No title captured]

[9] IN-KIND VERSUS CASH TRANSFERS IN THE PRESENCE OF DISTORTIONARY TAXES [J]. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1995, 33 (01) : 45 - 53

[10] IN-KIND TRANSFERS, CASH GRANTS AND LABOR SUPPLY [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1994, 55 (03) : 495 - 504