共 31 条
Negotiating environmental agreements under ratification constraints
被引:12
作者:
Koeke, Sonja
[1
,2
]
Lange, Andreas
[2
]
机构:
[1] Christian Albrechts Univ Kiel, Kiel, Germany
[2] Univ Hamburg, von Melle Pk 5, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany
关键词:
International environmental agreement;
Coalition formation;
Ratification;
Two-level games;
Uncertainty;
Minimum participation threshold;
DOMESTIC POLITICS;
MINIMUM PARTICIPATION;
2-LEVEL GAMES;
CLIMATE-CHANGE;
UNCERTAINTY;
DIPLOMACY;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jeem.2016.12.007
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
We analyze the impact of ratification constraints on the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). For this, we combine the literature on IEAs with the public choice literature on two-level games. By also incorporating uncertain preferences of the pivotal voter in the ratification stage, we make several important contributions: (i) we contribute to a more realistic modeling of the temporal structure of international agreements, (ii) we show a surprising, yet intuitive non-monotonic relationship between the optimal commitment level and the variance of ratification decisions, (iii) we identify reasons to expect a larger number of countries to join international negotiations than predicted by most of the coalition formation literature based on a representative agent model. Ratification constraints thereby can improve the welfare gains from stable international agreements. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码:90 / 106
页数:17
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