Decision theory and the rationality of further deliberation

被引：6

作者：

Douven, I ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Erasmus Univ, Dept Philosophy, Rotterdam, Netherlands

来源：

ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY | 2002年 / 18卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1017/S0266267102002079

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Bayesian decision theory operates under the fiction that in any decision-making situation the agent is simply given the options from which he is to choose. It thereby sets aside some characteristics of the decision-making situation that are pre-analytically of vital concern to the verdict on the agent's eventual decision. In this paper it is shown that and how these characteristics can be accommodated within a still recognizably Bayesian account of rational agency.

引用

页码：303 / 328

页数：26