Secrecy in International Relations and Foreign Policy

被引:27
作者
Carnegie, Allison [1 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, Dept Polit Sci, New York, NY 10025 USA
来源
ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VOL 24, 2021 | 2021年 / 24卷
关键词
secrecy; international relations; foreign policy; REGIME TYPE; DEVELOPMENT FINANCE; AUDIENCE COSTS; ISSUE LINKAGE; 3RD PARTIES; TRANSPARENCY; POLITICS; DEMOCRACY; DECEPTION; CREDIBILITY;
D O I
10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-102430
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Scholarship on the politics of secrecy in international relations and foreign policy has experienced tremendous growth in recent years. This article begins by providing an overview of this literature, analyzing the conditions under which leaders opt for secrecy in both economic and security domains. These motivations differ greatly depending on whether the presumed audience from which a leader keeps a secret is domestic, international, or corporate in nature. Next, it considers methodological innovations and challenges, particularly in the measurement of secrecy. Finally, it reflects on the lessons learned and discusses some exciting questions that scholars could explore in future research. As a burgeoning field within international relations, the study of secrecy offers a variety of promising and potentially fruitful directions.
引用
收藏
页码:213 / 233
页数:21
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