Pricing and entry in regulated industries: The role of regulatory design

被引：3
作者：
DeFraja, G [1 ]
机构：
[1] CHUO UNIV,TOKYO 112,JAPAN
来源：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 1997年 / 64卷 / 02期
基金：
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词：
entry; regulation; regulatory gap;
D O I：
10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01604-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper studies the optimal regulatory policy in a marker where entry may occur. In the event of entry, the regulator regulates the incumbent, but not the entrant. We show that the effect of entry on prices depends on the length of the interval between regulatory reviews: if the gap is long, then the market outcome following entry has a higher price than it would have with a shorter gap. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
引用
收藏
页码：259 / 278
页数：20
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