Inactivation of tumor suppressor genes and cancer therapy: An evolutionary game theory approach

被引:14
作者
Khadem, Heydar [1 ]
Kebriaei, Hamed [1 ,2 ]
Veisi, Zahra [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Tehran, Coll Engn, Sch Elect & Comp Engn, Tehran, Iran
[2] Inst Res Fundamental Sci IPM, Sch Comp Sci, Tehran, Iran
[3] Razi Univ, Dept Elect Engn, Kermanshah, Iran
关键词
Tumor suppressor gene; Evolutionary game theory; Equilibrium point; DYNAMICS; MODEL; RESISTANCE; HALLMARKS;
D O I
10.1016/j.mbs.2017.03.001
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Inactivation of alleles in tumor suppressor genes (TSG) is one of the important issues resulting in evolution of cancerous cells. In this paper, the evolution of healthy, one and two missed allele cells is modeled using the concept of evolutionary game theory and replicator dynamics. The proposed model also takes into account the interaction rates of the cells as designing parameters of the system. Different combinations of the equilibrium points of the parameterized nonlinear system is studied and categorized into some cases. In each case, the interaction rates' values are suggested in a way that the equilibrium points of the replicator dynamics are located on an appropriate region of the state space. Based on the suggested interaction rates, it is proved that the system doesn't have any undesirable interior equilibrium point as well. Therefore, the system will converge to the desirable region, where there is a scanty level of cancerous cells. In addition, the proposed conditions for interaction rates guarantee that, when a trajectory of the system reaches the boundaries, then it will stay there forever which is a desirable property since the equilibrium points have been already located on the boundaries, appropriately. The simulation results show the effectiveness of the suggestions in the elimination of the cancerous cells in different scenarios. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:84 / 93
页数:10
相关论文
共 37 条
  • [1] [Anonymous], 2014, P 21 ANN ACM SIAM S
  • [2] Evolutionary game theory of growth factor production: implications for tumour heterogeneity and resistance to therapies
    Archetti, M.
    [J]. BRITISH JOURNAL OF CANCER, 2013, 109 (04) : 1056 - 1062
  • [3] COEXISTENCE OF COOPERATION AND DEFECTION IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES
    Archetti, Marco
    Scheuring, Istvan
    [J]. EVOLUTION, 2011, 65 (04) : 1140 - 1148
  • [4] A prospective, randomized trial of autologous bone marrow transplantation and chemotherapy in multiple myeloma
    Attal, M
    Harousseau, JL
    Stoppa, AM
    Sotto, JJ
    Fuzibet, JG
    Rossi, JF
    Casassus, P
    Maisonneuve, H
    Facon, T
    Ifrah, N
    Payen, C
    Bataille, R
    [J]. NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, 1996, 335 (02) : 91 - 97
  • [5] August E, 2012, IEEE DECIS CONTR P, P3001, DOI 10.1109/CDC.2012.6426491
  • [6] Personalized drug administration for cancer treatment using Model Reference Adaptive Control
    Babaei, Naser
    Salamci, Metin U.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 2015, 371 : 24 - 44
  • [7] An evolutionary-game model of tumour-cell interactions: possible relevance to gene therapy
    Bach, LA
    Bentzen, SM
    Alsner, J
    Christiansen, FB
    [J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CANCER, 2001, 37 (16) : 2116 - 2120
  • [8] Investigating prostate cancer tumour-stroma interactions: clinical and biological insights from an evolutionary game
    Basanta, D.
    Scott, J. G.
    Fishman, M. N.
    Ayala, G.
    Hayward, S. W.
    Anderson, A. R. A.
    [J]. BRITISH JOURNAL OF CANCER, 2012, 106 (01) : 174 - 181
  • [9] The role of IDH1 mutated tumour cells in secondary glioblastomas: an evolutionary game theoretical view
    Basanta, David
    Scott, Jacob G.
    Rockne, Russ
    Swanson, Kristin R.
    Anderson, Alexander R. A.
    [J]. PHYSICAL BIOLOGY, 2011, 8 (01)
  • [10] Blanchini F, 2012, IEEE DECIS CONTR P, P5505, DOI 10.1109/CDC.2012.6427037